This paper explores the leverage impact on corporate cash holdings using SME data listed in the emerging Korean KOSPI market between 1980 and 2008. It is well known that SMEs are characterized by relatively high asymmetric information and agency cost. We focus on the relationship between cash holdings and leverage. We hypothesize that the impact of leverage on cash holdings is likely to be nonmonotonic for listed Korean SMEs, as asserted by Guney et al. (2007). As firms' leverage acts as a proxy for their ability to issue debt, we would expect to see a negative relation as a substitution effect between leverage and cash holdings. However, we might also expect firms to save larger cash levels as their leverage increases in order to minimize their risk of experiencing financial distress, costly bankruptcies, and the threat of default. Thus, we would expect to see a positive relation as a precautionary effect between leverage and cash holdings. We did not find this relationship during an analysis of a full period; we found only a substitution effect during the Korean financial crisis, whereas we found both the substitution and precautionary effects after the Korean financial crisis. Our findings provide robust support for the view that a significant non-monotonic relationship between leverage and cash holdings emerged only after the Korean financial crisis. It is clear, therefore, that SMEs tend to have a significant precautionary motivation for saving cash after suffering a financial shock. We make several discoveries by applying the Partial Adjustment Model (PAD) to market frictions such as adjustment and transaction costs. This application produces similar conclusions regarding the relationship between leverage and cash holdings. However, we can distinguish the results of the dynamic cash model from those of the static model as we analyze the relationship between cash holdings and size variable. This finding about SMEs suggests that, while large firms hold lower levels of cash, there may be other factors affecting the way in which the size of a firm exerted influence on the financial policy of its cash holding after the Korean financial crisis.
INTRODUCTION
Small and medium firms (SMEs) are Korea's most dominant corporate organizations. They suffered more pain during the Korean financial crisis of 1997 than did large firms. Korea's SMEs comprise a large portion of the *Corresponding author. nation's industry. According to 2007 statistics reported by the Korean Federation of Small and Medium Business, SMEs account for 99.5% of all Korean firms, hire 76.9% of the nation's employees, and create 50.6% of Korea's total national value added. Though considerable theoretical and empirical work has been done on the capital structure of publicly traded SMEs, few studies have focused on the relationship between the SMEs' cash holdings and capital structures. Most studies have analyzed the cash holdings of large firms. In contrast, we focus on the cash holdings of listed SMEs. Our paper defines listed SMEs as firms with a book equity value of 8 billion Korean won, as classified under the Korean law that governs SMEs. Many studies have found that it is much more difficult for small firms to access capital than for large, publicly traded firms. Small firms differ from large firms in their taxability, ownership, flexibility, industry, economies of scale, financial market access, level of information asymmetry, and capital structure. Thus, SMEs are vulnerable to many kinds of external shocks. We assume that capital structure and cash holdings are of paramount importance to small firms when they face external financing. When small firms need external financing from the capital market, their financing behaviors are more limited than are those of large firms. The capital structure of small firms is therefore inflexible. This paper investigates the leverage effect on SMEs' cash holding behavior by using a sample of small firms classified by the Korean government's firm code. This paper's main concern is the way leverage impacts on small firms' cash holding and the differences in impact across firm sizes, in the context of external economic shocks and SMEs' intrinsic weakness.
When beset by market frictions, small firms have to accumulate more liquid assets than usual. They therefore, should receive greater benefits from cash holding when coping with unexpected events, such as when irregular payments create a short-term liability, during a liquidity crisis, or during a period of macroeconomic uncertainty. Small firms are characterized by a higher information asymmetry than large firms, a more severe agency problem between debt holders and managers, a lower credit rating, and less ability to sustain themselves after an external shock. We hypothesize that small firms exhibit external financing behaviors, such as those involving cash holding and external financing that are very different from those of large firms.
Recent studies have noted that the financial policy of firms is to hold proper cash holdings, cash market value, and marginal cash value issues (Opler et al., 1999; Dittmar et al., 2003, Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Bates et al., 2009) . The most popular scholarly tactic is to investigate the determinants of cash holdings. Papers concerned with the determinant of cash holdings have argued that firms have several motivations, such as the transaction motive (Baumol, 1952; Miller and Orr, 1966; Mulligan, 1997) , the precautionary motive (Opler et al., 1999; Han and Qiu, 2007; Acharya et al., 2007) , the tax motive (Foley et al., 2007) , and the agency motive (Jensen, 1986; Dittmar et al., 2003; Harford et al., 2008) . Most of these papers have focused on the extent to which a firm's liquidity is impacted by frictions such as asymmetric information, agency costs, and financial distress. However, these studies have been confined to large, publicly traded firms; many frictions inflicted by the capital market would affect large firms less severely than they would small firms. Moreover, findings flowing from previous papers will not hold for small firms, since we assume that firm characteristic variables are correlated with cash holdings for all types of firms. This paper investigates the capital structure impact of the cash holdings of small firms that are publicly listed and traded in Korea composite stock price index (KOSPI) market. The small firms used in this paper are classified by the SME code of the Korean government. Empirical analyses on the linkage between capital structure (that is, leverage) and cash balances are rare, with Guney et al. (2007) being one of the few. However, even Guney et al. (2007) investigate the leverage effect on cash-holding behavior of firms from France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US using data for 4,069 companies over the period between 1996 and 2000 without drawing a line between large firms and small ones or investigating the non-linear impact of leverage on corporate cash holdings across a spectrum of different firm sizes. Our goal to use the results from a sample of SMEs and compare these results across a range of firm sizes.
This paper contributes to the literature in many ways. First, even though the empirical literature on the determinants of cash holdings has recently received much attention, most studies are concerned with large listed firms. In contrast, we focus on listed SMEs in the KOSPI and examine the leverage impact on their cash holdings. Secondly, prior studies of the determinants of cash holdings have presumed a linear relationship among cash holdings and firm characteristic factors. Contrariwise, we establish a model specification with a non-monotonic relationship and estimate the leverage impact on cash holdings in accordance with Guney et al. (2007) . Thirdly, in contrast to the work of Guney et al. (2007) and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) , besides the static cash model, we propose and test an additional partial adjustment model of the cash equation, assuming that cash mean reverting exists and that firm adjust the level corporate cash holdings over time. Fourthly, in order to better understand leverage and cash holdings in SMEs given the restrictions imposed by economic conditions, we divide the full period sample into two sub-periods to identify the impact of an economic shock and then compare the results of both samples. We might expect that listed SMEs differ in both sub-periods because they suffered the huge external economic shock of the Korean financial crisis. We argue that these different factors can be explained by the leverage that occurs in both samples. Accordingly, our analysis is also different from that of Na and Kim (2008) .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: brief review of the theory and empirical evidence concerning the relationship between leverage and cash holdings; presentation of the firm characteristics that affect cash holdings; the data are described and analyzed; the model specification and key results of this paper are explained and discussed; finally, we detail our conclusions.
LITERATURE REVIEW
It has been well studied that the level of cash holdings is one of accounting items of the asset structure that is under study. In a perfect market with no friction, cash holdings would be irrelevant. However, this assumption is certainty not relevant more for small firms rather than large firms due to the existence of asymmetrical information, agency cost, etc. The presence of information asymmetry may give rise to credit rating because adverse selection and moral hazard problems are more severe in SMEs rather than large firms and because they are not analyzed by financial analysts in stock market and lack any audited financial statements.
Due to these characterized for SMEs, as mentioned by Ang et al. (2000) and Faulkender (2004) the presence of market imperfections, higher agency costs of debt, and higher asymmetrical information seems to make cash holdings necessary for SMEs to avoid the high costs of acquiring new debt, which is called transaction motive, to meet unexpected contingencies that may arise to finance investments, if debt financing is unavailable or too costly, which is called precautionary motive, but also to keep control over the firms. Therefore, SMEs have a strong desire to keep control. Using SME data, Faulkender (2004) , Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008) suggest that firms with higher debt ratio tend to hold higher cash level. It is acknowledged that this relationship depends on firm size (large firm and SMEs) and sample period.
Transaction costs are potentially associated with raising capital in external markets that are avoided by using internally generated cash. Petersen and Rajian (2000) find that among the firms in survey, there are economies of scale in raising external financing, indicating that larger firm may hold relatively less the level of cash holdings than smaller firms. As stated by Bates et al. (2009) , the precautionary motive also suggests that firms with higher growth opportunities hold more cash because adverse shocks and financial distress are more costly for them. John (1993) recognizes that the leverage plays a significant role in shaping firms' cash policies and find that there is a negative relation between leverage and cash holdings. That is, firms can use borrowing as a substitute for holdings cash. Baskin (1987) suggests that firms with high leverage ratios have a higher cost of funds and hold less cash because of the higher costs of leverage. Kim et al. (1998) and Ferreira and Vilea (2004) demonstrates a reduction in cash levels when firms increase their financial leverage, which is negative relationship. Opler et al. (1999) find the evidence that cash holdings are negatively correlated to debt, which means that high cash levels are associated with low debt. Graham and Harvey (2001) suggest that in their survey study, firms can maintain financial flexibility through having large cash reserves and unused debt capacity (low leverage), implying a negative relationship between Kim et al. 13097 firms' cash reserves and leverage. These results are also confirmed in Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) . Focusing on leverage and cash reserves, Guney et al. (2007) argue that the relationship between cash reserves and leverage can be non-monotonic implying that the marginal effect of increased leverage depends on the current level. That is, at high levels of leverage firms are more likely to face financial distress and, thus, accumulate larger cash holdings in order to minimize the risk of costly bankruptcy and financial distress. On the other hand, it has been advocated that lower cash asset creates the need to reduce the probability of costly default by lowering the leverage, which means positive relationship. Williamson (1988) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that more cash assets increase optimal leverage. Specifically, Williamson (1988) documents those assets that are more liquid, or more redeployable, should be financed with debt more often, because banks and public debt markets incur lower costs from financing these assets. In similar idea, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) predict about the relation between asset liquidity and capital structure, arguing that asset liquidity affects the expected costs of distress because less liquid assets sell at higher discounts relative to their fair values. Harris and Raviv (1990) argue that as asset liquidity increase, the costs of default drop, and investors are more likely to use debt to obtain information about the firm. In listed Korean firms, Gong (2006) find that leverage effect of cash holdings has negative. Na and Kim (2008) investigated unlisted SMEs and concluded the same result. They also setup non-linear relationship between leverage and cash holdings and in this study, quadratic relationship is confirmed.
FIRMS CHARACTERISTICS THAT AFFECT CASH HOLDING Leverage: (linear -or +) (non-linear -and +)
To the extent that leverage ratio acts as a proxy for the ability of firms to issue debt one would expect a negative relation between leverage and cash holdings. Under this view, John (1993) hypothesizes that firms can use borrowing as a substitute for holding high levels of cash. Baskin (1987) argues that the cost of funds used to invest in liquidity increases as debt financing increases, implying a reduction in cash holdings with increased debt in capital structure. The empirical evidence for negative relation is found in Kim et al. (1998 ), Opler et al. (1999 ), Ferreira and Vilea (2004 , and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) . Gong (2006) also finds this relation using Korean all firms listed in KOSPI. On the other hand, Guney et al. (2007) argue that a negative relation between cash holdings and leverage at low level of leverage is expected and in turn a positive relation at high levels of leverage will be. They provide the evidence of this relation as non-monotonic fact. Na and Kim (2008) also confirm this relation using Korean unlisted SMEs.
In another view, Williamson (1998) , Shleif and Vishny (1992) argue that as higher cash asset decreases the expected costs of financial distress, it is allowed firm to take more debt and thus the amount of debt increases. Also we argue that as mentioned by Guney et al. (2007) , firms are likely to accumulate large cash level to minimize the risk of financial distress and bankruptcy cost as leverage increase because of precautionary motivation. In this paper, as a proxy for leverage, we use ratio of total debt divided by total assets.
Control variable for cash holdings
Prior studies find the determinants of cash holdings and we employ and control these determinants to draw the leverage impact on cash holdings.
Bank debt: debt maturity structure (+ or -)
It is recognized that bank debt is related to liquidity default problem. The distribution in the debt maturities between short and long term can also affect decisions concerning liquid financial assets (Guney et al., 2003; Ferreira and Vilea, 2004) . Moreover, the use of short-term debt obliges firms to periodically negotiate the renewal of their credits, with the consequent risk of refinancing. In debt maturity models, one key insight is that firms with a high degree of potential information asymmetry are likely to issue short-term debt (Myers, 1977; Flannery, 1986; Diamond, 1993) . To the extent that short-term debt is a proxy for the high degree of informational asymmetry, firms with more short-term debt in their capital structure are expected to hold more cash because their access to other external financing would be limited by the high degree of informational asymmetry. Here is another view with negative effect on cash holdings. Diamond (1984) , Boyd and Prescott (1986) argue that the external financing from bank is more effective rather than issuing public debt in order to reduce problems associated with information asymmetry and agency conflicts because of the comparative advantage of banks in terms of monitoring firms' activities and collecting and processing information (Fama, 1985) . This advantage allows bank to evaluate and monitor borrowers more effectively than other groups. In turn, it implies that such firms should hold less cash. Furthermore, it is suggested that as argued by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) , bank debt is more easily renegotiated when firms need fund. Due to this flexibility through renegotiation, bank debt may be provided as a substitution for holding high levels of cash.
In this paper, we define the debt maturity structure (Bank D) as the ratio of debt that matures in less than one year to total debts. Myers and Majluf (1984) insist that under existing of information asymmetry, firms will establish a hierarchy in their use of funding sources. According to hierarchy or pecking order theory, firms prefer to fund themselves with resources generated internally before resorting to the market. Under these circumstances, firms with large cash flows are more likely to keep higher cash holdings (Opler et al., 1999; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Ferreira and Vilea, 2004) . However, Kim et al. (1998) demonstrate that firms with higher cash levels show more volatility in their cash flows and less profitability, that is, negative relation between cash holdings and cash flow. In this paper, we measure cash flow (CF) as the ratio of pre-tax profit plus depreciation to total assets as a proxy for cash flow variable.
Cash flow (+ or -)

Liquidity (+ or -)
It is predicted in two ways. First, there is a negative or positive relation between cash holdings and liquidity assets (Williamson, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Morellec, 2001; Myers and Rajan, 1998) . That is, for negative view, to the extent that firms can use other liquid assets besides cash when they suffer cash shortfalls, these assets can be seen as substitutes for cash holdings. For positive view, liquid assets are less costly to monitor and liquidate for bondholders and so higher asset liquidity increases the amount of capital firms can borrow, as well as the optimal leverage (Williamson, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1992) .
Also in trade-off theory, when choosing the appropriate level of debt, investors trade off the expected costs of default against potential improvements in the operating policy of a firm. As asset liquidity increases, the costs of default decrease, and investors are more likely to use debt to obtain information about the company (Harris and Raviv, 1992) . In this paper, as a proxy for liquidity, we measure liquidity as current asset minus total cash and equivalent divided by total assets. Kim et al. (1998) , Opler et al. (1999) , Ferreira and Vilea (2004) , Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) , and Guney et al. (2007) suggest that growth opportunities in firms are an important determinant that positively affects cashholdings. Myers (1977) argues that growth firms face higher agency costs because firms with risky debt give up some of the valuable investment opportunities when the investment opportunity set of firms consists of growth opportunities, which is called underinvestment. Also Myers and Majluf (1984) point out that firms whose value is largely determined by their growth opportunities incur higher external financing costs. Additionally, Harris and Raviv (1990) , Shleifer and Vishny (1992) , and Williamson (1998) argue that firms with more growth opportunities may also be expected to incur higher cost of financial distress and bankruptcy cost because their value depends on their growth opportunities rather than on tangible asset or specific cash flows. Thus, this type of firm will keep higher cash holdings to avoid these costs. In this paper, as a proxy for growth opportunities of firms, we employ the market-to-book ratio(MBR) defined as the ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to book value of assets.
Growth opportunities (market-to-book): (+)
Size (-)
Baumol (1952), Miller and Orr (1966), and Mulligan (1997) demonstrated that there are economics of scale associated with the cash holdings required to confront the normal transactions of the firm, so that larger firms can keep lower cash holdings. Also Titman and Wessels (1988) insisted that larger firms are more likely to be diversified and thus less likely to face financial distress. Ozkan (1996) argued that smaller firms are more likely to be liquidated when they are in financial distress. Smaller firms suffer more severe information asymmetries (Berger et al., 2001 ) and more financial constraints (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993) and they are more likely to suffer financial distress (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Titman and Wessel, 1988) . These arguments suggest relationship between size and cash holdings of firms. In our paper, we use the natural logarithm of total sales scaled by 1990 consumer price index as a proxy for the size of firms (SIZE).
Dividend (-)
It is argued that the dividend variable is likely to be negatively correlated with cash holdings, since a firm can cut its dividend when cash is needed. On the other hand, Grossman and Hart (1980) , Easterbrook (1984) , and Jensen (1986) argued that dividends may help reduce the agency problem by reducing the amount of cash executives have at their disposal. As proxy for dividend, we take 1 if dividend is paid, otherwise 0.
Cash flow variability (+)
It is argued that the greater the firm's cash flow variability, the greater the number of states of nature in which the firm will face short of liquid assets. Guney et al. (2007) contend that firms with more volatile cash flows are expected to hold more cash in an attempt to mitigate the expected costs of liquidity constraints. After short falling of liquid asset, when firms have valuable growth opportunities, then these opportunities are given up and firm Kim et al. 13099 value will be drop. Minton and Schrand (1999) find that firms with higher volatile cash flow permanently forgo investment rather than reacting to cash flow shortfalls by changing the discretionary investment timing. Thus, we expect the positive relation between cash flow and cash holdings. The measure we use for cash flow variability in this paper is the standard deviation of cash flows over the three year period of sample period.
Ownership structure (-and nonlinear): managerial and institutional ownership
Ownership structure about relation between leverage and cash is as follows: Jensen and Meckling (1976) assert that the agency cost between the shareholder and manager are mitigated as ownership of the firm's manager increases, since ownership tends to align the priorities of management with shareholders. Based on this story, if accumulation of cash by management is a form of agency cost, then one would expect that cash levels would decrease with those variables that proxy for agency cost mitigation. Faulkender (2004) find a negative relationship between cash holdings and firm ownership in small firms. However, Opler et al. (1999) find no relationship between managerial ownership and cash holdings, though their sample concentrated on larger firms. For small firms with few shareholders who may have a close family with the firm, monitoring could be very effective. We expect that there will be a negative relationship between managerial ownership and cash holdings. In addition, we examine whether institutional ownership has any impact on cash holdings. In theory, it does not shed much light on the exact nature of the relationship between institutional ownership and cash holdings. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) and Black (1992) argue that as institutional ownership increases, firms with more proportion of them play a monitoring role strongly. Thus, generally it is assumed that institution investors are interested in long-term investment as argued by Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) . Therefore, it is acknowledged that it is expected as a positive relationship between leverage and institutional ownership.
DATA AND SAMPLE STATISTICS Data
The data used for this study are focused on a sample of SMEs publicly listed in KOSPI stock market and classified by the law of SMEs and collected through the FnGuide database from Korea during the period 1980 to 2008. FnGuide database provides both accounting data form of firms, and market value of equity. We exclude firms of financial sector in our sample. Also firms with below 2 year time series are deleted because some variables are lagged for one year or two years. The sample number of mean SME firms included in this paper is 134 (34% of total firms) and the number of mean non-SME firms is 257 (66% of total firms). Total firm-year observations are 2,247. Figure 1 show our sample SME firms and Number Figure 1 . Plot of number of SMEs and non-SME firms by year.
non-SMEs firm by year. It is shown that the numbers of SME firms decrease and the numbers of Non-SME firms increase after 1990 year. Table 1 presents the definition of variables used in our sample. Among key variables, the dependent variable used previous studies has been measured in two ways: (1) as used Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) , Cash ratio (cash) is measured as total cash and cash equivalent divided by total assets, (2) as employed Opler et al. (1999) , net cash ratio (NetCash) is defined as total cash and cash equivalent divided by total net assets, where total net assets are total assets minus total cash and cash equivalent. In our paper, we use net cash as dependent variable. Other variables are shown in Table 1 . Table 2 reports summary statistics for the main variables of SMEs used in this paper. Cash and net cash mean value is 7.46 and 8.54%, respectively. Leverage mean value is 59.98%. Table 3 show the basic test of difference in means for main variables used in our analysis to compare large and SMEs. In mean difference test between large firms and SMEs, all variable used in this paper are different statistically based on t-test and Wilcoxon test except market-to-book variable (MBR). Thus we point out that the variables for SMEs are distinct from large firms. Table 4 reports simple comparisons of the firm-specific characteristics by quintile. That is, current mean and median of variable based on lagged net cash holdings by each quintile are shown in Table 4 . We implement this analysis by constructing quintile for lagged net cash holdings ratio and examine whether the firm-specific characteristics of high net cash firms (Q5) differ significantly from those of low net cash firms (Q1). It is found that there is strong evidence that high net cash SMEs show significantly different characteristics from low net cash SMEs at the 1 or 5% the level in t-test and Wilcoxon test except cash flow variability (CFV), liquidity, Ln (size), and owner variables. Thus, it is distinct that firms with higher cash flows (CF) and greater growth opportunity (MBR) presents higher levels of cash. In contrast, it is also evidence that as lagged cash holdings increase, bank debt decreases. When we focus on leverage, as lagged net cash increase from Q1 to Q5, leverage decreases as well, but after Q4 point, it increases, implying the evidence that there may be a possibility of existing non-linear relationship between leverage and lagged net cash. This evidence is preliminary motivation for investigating substitution and precautionary effect of cash holdings. Table 5 presents the current mean and median value in two-way sorting by lagged leverage and lagged firms size of SMEs. Also in Table 5 , given leverage, the net cash holdings difference between lowest size and highest size is tested using t-test and nonparametric Wilcoxon test. Mainly the difference of net cash holdings is pronounced in highest leverage quintile (L5). Thus, it seems that SMEs with high leverage could have large different cash holdings. As shown in Table 6 , it is provided that leverage, market-to-book ratio (MBR), cash flow variability (CFV), dividend (dividend dummy), and institution ownership (Inst) are positive relationship with net cash holdings. However, it is found that there are negative relationship bank debt (bank D), liquidity, firm size (Ln (size)), and large ownership with regard to net cash holdings.
Variables and summary statistics
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We first present the results for our cross-sectional regression using static cash model by estimating pooled OLS and fixed effect model regression with clustering of firm and year suggested in Petersen (2008) as model employed by Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) . Then we also develop cash adjustment model and provide its results by using Panel GMM technique (Arellano and Bond, 1991) adopt in Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) .
Static cash model and result
The static cash model with fixed effect is setup to find relationship between cash and leverage as used in Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) and Guney et al. (2007) . We extend model of Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) to nonmonotonic form and this is similar to model of Guney et al. (2007) . We measure net cash holding as defined in Table  1 and use this variable as dependent variable. The static fixed effect model for cash model suggested above is as follows: 
Variable Definition Cash
Total amount of cash and cash equivalent/total assets (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004) Net cash (NetCash) Total amount of cash and cash equivalent/total net assets (Opler et al., 1999) , where net assets = total assets -cash and cash equivalent Size Natural log of sales Equity (book value: 1,000 Won Unit)
Book value of equity Cash flow (CF)
Pre-tax profit plus depreciation to total assets Leverage Total debt to total assets Bank debt (BankD) Short-term debt /total debt Liquidity (Liduidity) Current Asset minus total cash and equivalent /Total assets Growth opportunity (market-to-book ratio: MBR)
The ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to book value of total assets Dividend dummy Dividend is equal to 1 if a firm pays dividend for a given year, otherwise 0. It is a proxy for financial constraints (Fazzari et al., 1988) Cash flow variability (CFV) 
NetCash is the dependent variable defined as the ratio of cash and cash equivalent to net assets, where net asset is total assets minus cash and cash equivalent. First, we use pooled OLS to estimate Equation 1. However, the residuals in pooled OLS may be correlated across firms or across time and pooled OLS standard errors can be biased (Petersen, 2008) . As mentioned by Petersen (2008) , we employ the clustering multiple dimension model with cluster standard error to obtain consistent coefficient estimates.
Accordingly, we estimate the static cash model by controlling for fixed-specific effect (time and firm) as fixed effect model for panel data. Thus we compare the both results of pooled OLS and clustering multiple dimension models.
Leverage and cash holdings
We investigate whether leverage affects cash holdings according to a non-monotonic relationship; we seek to probe Guney et al.'s (2007) assertion that the substitution effect at a low level of leverage is more likely to show a negative relationship and a precautionary effect than at a high level of leverage, when it is more likely to show a positive relationship 1 . Table 7 shows the first set of estimates for both pooled cross-sectional and time-series results and fixed effect results with clustering firm and year from static cash model as equation (1), covering the full 1980 to 2008 period of our sample. Table 8 covers sub-period 1, from 1980 to 1996, before the Korean financial crisis, and Table 9 covers sub-period 2, from 1999 to 2008, after the Korean financial crisis. We drop the years between 1997 and 1998 from our sample in order to remove an unavoidable fact about the nature of firms' capital structure decisions of that period: the Korean government imposed its capital structure policy onto firms' financial decisions and thus affected their leverage. Since we are focusing on the non-linear relationship between lagged leverage and cash holdings, the inclusion of the quadratic form, namely lagged leverage and lagged leverage, allows the effect of lagged leverage on cash holdings to vary with the value of lagged leverage. This is different from the linear form, which examines a constant effect. In Table 7 , as expected of both positive and negative signs, we find evidence of a quadratic relationship between lagged leverage and cash holdings. Specifically, we observe a negative relationship between lagged leverage and cash holdings, which is, unfortunately, not statistically significant. However, the relationship between these two variables turns out to be positive at higher levels of lagged leverage but is unfortunately not significant statistically, regardless of the model and estimation method. These findings are consistent with Guney et al. (2007) , except as regards their significance. Consistent with Guney et al. (2007) , our results support the view that firm borrowing can initially be seen as a substitute for holding cash. However, as leverage increases, it seems that the probability of financial distress, which is a function of leverage, leads firms to accumulate much larger cash holdings at higher levels of leverage in an attempt to minimize the risk of costly bankruptcy and other financial crises. This evidence is consistent with the preliminary data shown in Table 4 . The full period of our analysis seems to show a substitution effect for cash holdings, which is consistent with most of the studies of unlisted Korean SMEs, such as Baskin (1987) , John (1993) , Kim et al. (1998) , Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) , and Na and Kim (2008) . However, Faulkender (2004) and Garcia-Teruel and MartinezSolano (2008) find a positive relationship: these authors indicate that SME firms find it so difficult to gain access to capital markets that they feel it beneficial to maintain high levels of cash rather than use the cash to reduce their debt. Table 8 shows that the relationship between lagged leverage and cash holdings before the Korean financial crisis was negative and significant at 5% (for model 1 and model 4) and 10% (for model 2 and model 3), suggesting that a non-linear relationship may not exist. After the Korean financial crisis, however, as Table 9 shows, the leverage decisions of Korean SMEs influenced their cash levels significantly and non-linearly. Thus, it is apparent that the squared lagged leverage variable is positive and significant at the 1% level, regardless of the model and estimation method. Specifically, it appears that (as explained by the substitution effect) SME firms can borrow as a substitute for holding cash (John, 1993) and, further, that they maintain financial flexibility by having large cash reserves and unused debt capacity (that is, low leverage), implying a negative relationship at the initial leverage level. Korean SMEs are more likely to face financial distress at high levels of leverage; they thus accumulate larger cash reserves in order to minimize the risk of costly bankruptcy and other financial crises. The tradeoff theory posits that firms with high leverage hold more cash in order to reduce the probability of experiencing financial crises and costly bankruptcies. This result is in line with Guney et al. (2007) and Ginglinger and Saddour (2007) . Bates et al. (2009) provide the evidence that the precautionary motive for cash holdings plays an important role in explaining the increase in cash ratios. Our findings suggest that the difference in result between the after-Korean-financial-crisis period and the before-Korean-financial-crisis period occurs because of the economic shock. In fact, we argue that Korean SMEs' financial policy changed completely because of the Korean financial crisis. Therefore, the evidence we detail above strongly supports the existence of the substitution and precautionary effects, results that are consistent with Na and Kim (2008) . In summary, SMEs' leverage effect on cash holdings after the Korean financial crisis can be explained as a product of the substitution and precautionary effects.
Control variables and cash holdings
Cash flow (+ or -) and cash flow variability: Table 7 shows that the lagged cash flow (CF) is positive and significant at the 1% level throughout the full sample period, regardless of the model and estimation method. This evidence suggests that firms generating larger cash flows possess greater cash holdings and that firms prefer to finance themselves with internally generated resources when facing information asymmetries, as mentioned by Gracia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008) . This result is also consistent with Jensen (1986), Opler et al. (1999) , Gong (2006) , and Na and Kim (2008) but inconsistent with Kim et al. (1998) .
Before the Korean financial crisis, the coefficient value is negative but not significant. This evidence demonstrates that, as argued by Kim et al. (1998) , lagged cash flow provides a ready source of liquidity for investment and maturing liabilities and that the risk of having to pass up investment opportunities and facing financial distress is lower for firms with higher cash flow. However, after the Korean financial crisis, the estimated coefficient of lagged cash flow is positive and significant at 1%, regardless of the method and estimation method. Thus, such firms can afford to have lower cash holdings. Here, we find the evidence that economic shock is a very important factor in SMEs' financial policies. Lagged cash flow variability (CFV) is also positive but not significant throughout the full analysis period. Before the Korean financial crisis period, this coefficient is negative and not significant, a result consistent with Minton and Schrand (1999) . However, after the Korean financial crisis period, the estimated coefficient is positive and significant at the 1 and 5% levels. This evidence suggests that Korean SMEs change their financial policies and accumulate cash reserve, indicating higher cash holdings, as cash flow increases after 1997. Thus, current cash ratios increase because firms' lagged cash flows become riskier, a conclusion in line with Minton and Schrand (1999) , Bates et al. (2009) , and Na and Kim (2008) .
Bank D:
We observe that the coefficient of the variable lagged BankD is negative and significant at the 1% level for the full sample period and after the Korean financial crisis. The coefficient is also negative but insignificant before the Korean financial crisis. As mentioned by Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008), this result indicates that maintaining a banking relationship improves access to this type of external financing by reducing the information asymmetry between borrower and lender. According to this view, and as confirmed empirically by Ferreria and Vilea (2004) , and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) , firms that are more highly indebted to credit institutions can reduce their investment in liquid financial assets. This result shows that the coefficient has a stronger negative value and a higher significance than the coefficient estimated using the sample from before the Korean financial crisis. Thus, we demonstrate that firms tend to stay close to bankers in order to avoid a short-term cash shortfall after experiencing an economic Liquidity: For full sample period, we observe that the relation between cash holdings and lagged asset liquidity (Liquidity) is negative and significant at 1% regardless of models and estimation methods. Before Korean financial crisis period, the result is the same to above. This result supports the hypothesis that firms with more lagged liquid assets will tend to reduce their current cash levels because these assets can be used as cash substitutes. This evidence is consistent with Wilkiamson (1988) , Shleifer and Vishny (1992) , Myers and Rajan (1998) , and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) . However, After Korean financial crisis, the estimated coefficient is changed, that is, positive and significant at 1% level. This evidence suggests that since most SMEs' firms experienced large economy shock and had liquidation threat, they worry about this situation and so they accumulate more liquidity asset in order to protect them from liquidity bankruptcy. This result implies that as liquidity asset increases, firms are likely to reduce default cost, and also the capacity of firm's borrowing will be increased, and then leverage increases. This argument also is supported from Table 6 , which the correlation between liquidity and leverage is positive and significant in Table 6 . This evidence is in line with trade-off theory in Harris and Raviv (1992) , Williamson (1988), and Shleifer and Vishny (1992) .
MBR:
The estimated coefficients are positive and significant at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively for full period, before Korean financial crisis, and after Korean financial crisis regardless of models and estimation methods. This result strongly support evidence that firms with past more growth opportunities hold more current cash. Also it is acknowledged that Korean SMEs' firms persistently keep continuing same liquidity asset policy whenever they face any economy situation. This result demonstrates that due to higher agency costs, higher external financing costs, and underinvestment problem, firms with more growth opportunities keep holding more cash to avoid these problems. Our result is consistent with Myers (1977) , Kim et al. (1998), Ferreira and Vilea (2004) , Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) , Guney et al. (2007) , and Na and Kim (2008) for unlisted Korean SMEs.
Size:
The relationship between firm size and cash holdings is strongly negative and significant at 1% under any specifications and estimation methods for full period, before Korean financial crisis, and after Korean financial crisis. As earlier mentioned, this evidence suggests that since small size firms are more likely to suffer financial distress (Titman and Wessel, 1988; Ozakan, 1996) , liquidation, more borrowing constraints, and higher costs of external financing (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993; Kim et al., 1998) , the estimated coefficient for Korean SMEs is Kim et al. 13109 likely to be negative. Also this result supports information asymmetry, which size is an inverse proxy for the degree of informational asymmetry between insiders in a firm and the outside investors. Thus, our evidence confirms this fact using listed Korean SMEs sample data. This result is consistent with Kim et al. (1998) , Ferreira and Vilea (2004) , Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2008), Gong (2006) , and Na and Kim (2008) .
Dividend: As earlier mentioned, it is expected that there is a negative relationship between lagged dividend and current cash holdings. However, unexpectedly, we find positive relationship. Specifically, for full period, the estimated coefficient is positive and significant (pooled OLS) at 1% level or insignificant (clustering fixed effect model), which is inconsistency. Before Korean financial crisis, the sign of coefficient remains positive, but significant at 5% under any specification and estimation methods. After Korean financial crisis, the coefficient is positive, but insignificant regardless of any models and estimation methods. This result implies that after suffering Korean financial crisis, for listed Korean SMEs' firms, dividend policy has been changed but thus, not determinant on cash holdings.
Ownership structure
First, we examine the question of whether ownership structure affects cash levels. As argued by Guney et al. (2007) , Ownership concentration might have important implications for potential agency problems. In our empirical test, for full period, expectedly estimated coefficient of ownership structure (Owner) is negative and significant at 1 and 5% level regardless of any methods and estimation methods. This evidence suggests that as the percentage owned by the largest shareholder increases, the agency cost is drop and therefore, the cost of external financing would be lower for firms with large shareholders, indicating less need to hold large cash balances. This result is consistent with Guney et al. (2007) and Faulkender (2004) . Before Korean financial crisis, this coefficient is negative, but not significant at all and after Korean financial crisis, it is negative and significant at 5% under any models and methods. This importantly demonstrates that after Korean SMEs' firms experienced economy hardship, large owners play a key role in SMEs' firm cash policy. It is documented that this is very important implication in analyzing corporate governance effect on cash holdings when external economy shock occurs. Additionally, the interaction effect of leverage and governance structure using Lev*Owner variable is investigated. That is, we examine the question of whether the interaction from firms with high (or low) leverage and high (low) ownership concentration simultaneously affect cash holdings. It is because ownership concentration may act as a substitute for other legal characteristics as argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1977) and Guney et al. (2007) .
We incorporate the interaction term, Lev*Owner into model 2 and model 4 from Table 7 , 8, and 9. Estimated coefficient of ownership structure is positive and significant at 5%, respectively in model 2 and model 4 for full period. When we estimate the ownership structure alone, coefficient, Owner is negative. However, after including interaction term, coefficient of Lev*Owner variable is positive and significant at 5% level. This result implies that firm with higher leverage and more ownership concentration tends to increases cash level. However, interestingly before Korean financial crisis, this fact disappears. That is, model 2 and 4 in Table 8 provide that estimated coefficients of interaction term, Lev*Owner, are negative and insignificant, indicating no significant role in determining cash holdings before 1997 year. After Korean financial crisis, this result remains similarity to the result of full period. This evidence remarkably provides us listed Korean SMEs' financial cash policy. That is, it is found that after economy hardship, Korean SMEs' firm with higher monitoring of large shareholder and higher leverage want to accumulate more cash level. Thus this result indicates that negative substitution effect of leverage reduces as the ownership structure increases and this explanation is based on the positive estimated coefficient of the interaction term, Lev*Owner. Our result is consistent with Guney et al. (2007) .
Secondly, we also scrutinize the institutional ownership role in accumulating cash assets. For full sample period, the estimated coefficient of institutional ownership is positive and significant at 5 and 10%. This result implies that as mentioned by Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) and Black (1992) , it seems to be that Koran institution as long-term investor tends to save more cash for future investment. However, when the interaction term, Lev*Inst is include in models 2 and 4, signs of coefficient are changed as negative, even insignificant. Based on both evidences, we conclude that for full sample period, Korean institution affects positive on listed Korean SMEs' cash holdings, but it is appeared that firms with more concentrated institution ownership and high leverage do not increase the level of cash holdings. This evidence is inconsistent with the result of above findings. Before Korean financial crisis, coefficient of institution ownership was not significant at all, even negative or positive depending on model and estimation method. Thus it is evidence that before Korean financial crisis, institutional ownership does not play an important role in decision of cash holding for listed Korean SEMs. Here is interesting fact, which it is found that coefficient of interaction term, Lev*Inst, is negative and significant at After Korean financial crisis, it is hard for institutional ownership to plays a significant role in determining SMEs' cash holdings based on evidence of insignificant coefficient under model 1, 3, and 4 except model 2. It is inferred that after Korean financial crisis, similarity to evidence before Korean financial crisis, institutional play a weak role in SMEs cash policy. However, interesting fact is found that the interaction term, Lev*Inst seems to play a significant role in decision of cash holdings. That is, SMEs with interaction between higher leverage and more institutional ownership tend to increase cash holdings. This result suggests that after economy shock as Korean financial crisis, SMEs could consider leverage and institutional ownership to decide how to accumulate cash holdings. This evidence is very interesting for SMEs.
Dynamic cash model and results
Additionally we incorporate the view that market frictions such as adjustment and transaction costs may hinder the rapidly adapting of firm to new circumstances. We utilize a partial adjustment model that allows for the possibility of delays in response of firms in adjusting their cash holdings. That is, we apply the partial adjustment model (PAD) suggested in many empirical test for leverage speed and also extend and fit this model in order for our paper purpose. In some paper, PAD is often used to find mean reverting phenomena (Flannery and Rangan, 2006) . Actual PAD has been employed to test dividend and leverage adjustment behavior of firms. For example, an origin as Lintner Dividend-Adjustment Model, Frank and Goyal (2003) , Titman and Tsyplakov (2004) , Leary and Roberts (2005) , and Flannery and Rangan (2006) adopt to attempt estimating the target leverage, adjustment costs, and adjustment speeds.
To estimate target cash ratio Cash * i,t , we suppose that unobservable target cash ratio of firms, Cash * i,t is taken to be function of leverage variable and several firm-specific characteristics, K, as control variables; and a distribution term. This idea is applied as suggested by partial adjustment model used in testing trade-off theory and model specification for cash equation is as follows:
where firms are denoted as subscript i = 1,…,N and time as t = 1,…,T. Cash * i, t+1 is firm i's target cash ratio at t+1. Cash i,t is vector for firm characteristics related to the costs and benefits of operating with various cash ratios and it is well known that this vector is playing in significant role in determining corporate cash holdings suggested by many previous studies such as Kim et al. (1998) , Kalcheva and Lins (2004) , Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), and Harford et al. (2008) .
As mentioned by Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) , firms adjust their cash holdings in order for their current cash to be close to the target ratio and this intuition leads to a partial adjustment mechanism given by
where Cash i,t is the actual cash ratio.
can be interpreted as the gap between actual lagged cash holdings and target cash holdings. For each year, the typical firm closes a proportion of λ of this gap where only a fraction λ of it is achieved. The value of the adjustment coefficient λ lies between 0 and 1, figuring out the ability of firms to adjust to their target cash levels. If λ is 1, it means that firms are able to adjust immediately, that is, Cash i,t = Cash * i,t , indicating zero adjustment costs. In contrast, if λ = 0, then this model implies that adjustment costs are so large that firms cannot change their existing cash holding level, that is, Cash i,t = Cash i,t-1 . This Kim et al. 13111 intuition follows next logical theory. In a perfect world, firms would always maintain their target cash holding level. However, adjustment costs may prevent immediate adjustment to a firm's target cash holdings, as the firm trades off these adjustment costs against the costs of operating with sub-optimal cash ratios. In estimating this model, incomplete or partial adjustment of the firm's initial cash ratio toward its target within each time period is reflected. Then combining Equations 2 and 3 and adding intercept term and the leverage variable separated from X vector and including v i and v t generate our testable model in quadratic form (non-monotonic). Let γ 0 = 1-λ, γ k = 1-λ, and u i,t = λε i,t and u i,t has the same properties as ε i,t . Accordingly, we extend model employed by Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) and setup following dynamic panel data specification: 
where v i and v t denote firm-specific effects and timeeffects, respectively. This model assumes that firmsspecific effects, v i , are unobservable but have a significant impact on cash holdings. Also they differ across firms but are fixed for a given firm through time. In contrast, time-effects, v t vary through time but are the same for all firms in a given year, capturing mainly economy-wide factors that are outside the firms' control (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004) . Here, we employ this idea and estimate the dynamic cash model by controlling for fixedeffects by a first-difference transformation adopt by Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) . Equation 4 is typically AR (1) model with lagged cash holdings. Eventually Equation 4 says that managers take actions to close the gap between where they are (Cash i,t ) and where they wish to be ( β k X k,i,,t-1 ). Moreover, Equation 4 means that based on the evidence found in Guney et al. (2007) paper, the relationship between cash holdings and leverage is initially expected to be negative due to a substitution effect but eventually turns positive due to the precautionary effect. Thus, based on this logical idea, we estimate a quadratic model including leverage and the squared leverage.
Since Equation 4 is typical dynamic model with panel data with AR (1) of cash holdings, when OLS and fixed regression model is employed, the dynamic specification (Equation 4) involves many estimation problem. That is, actually the combination of fixed effects and lagged dependent variables found in dynamic panels of Equation 4 introduces serious econometrics bias (Nickell, 1981; Baltagi, 2005) . Also the usual fixed effect regressions generate coefficient biases that are inversely related to panel length. This is particularly important in panels of corporate data because the number of observations for each firm is generally quite small, especially using year data from corporate firms. The short panel bias is a significant concern in equation (4). Specifically, ∆Cash i,t-1 and ∆u i,t-1 could be correlated through lagged cash terms, Cash i,t-1 and u i,t-1 , and hence, OLS will not be consistent unbiased estimated coefficient. Another estimation problem arises that the firm-characteristic variables are unlikely to be strictly exogenous. That is, shocks affecting cash holdings of firms are also likely to affect some of the regressors, that is, independent variables such as liquidity, leverage, firm size, dividend, and etc. Furthermore, it is likely that some of the regressors may be correlated with the past and current values of the idiosyncratic component of disturbances.Based on this motivation, to avoid these problems mentioned above, we attempt to adapt instrumental variables and then use panel GMM technique suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) , where the lagged dependent variable and endogenous regressors are used as instrumental variable. GMM method provides consistent parameter estimates by utilizing instruments that can be obtained from the orthogonality conditions that exist between the lagged values of the variables and disturbance (Arellano and Bond, 1991) . In GMM method, the consistency of the estimates is obviously subject to an optimal choice of instruments where the validity of instruments depends on the absence of higher-order serial correlation is reported. We provide the statistic for the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, suggesting whether the instrumental variables and residuals are independent. Table 10 reports the GMM estimation result of the dynamic cash model for Equation 4. As used by Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) , all variables (that is, instrumental variables) are treated as endogenous. To check for the validity of the specification of the instrumental variable (over-identifying) used in the GMM estimation in Table 10 , the Sargan test is implemented with χ 2 (df = 116), following the null hypothesis that the instrumental variables are not over-identified. As shown in Table 10 , the null hypotheses for the full period and each sub-period are not rejected; we thus conclude that the model specification is correct with our instrumental variables. Additionally, the AR (1) test suggests that, as expected, there is evidence for a negative first-order serial correlation, whereas the AR (2) test indicates that there is no evidence for a second-order serial correlation, as was assumed of the dynamic panel model. Thus, the Sargan test indicates that the instruments used in the GMM estimation are not correlated with the error term.
In Table 10 , we have a focus on leverage and cash holdings in a quadratic form: the result of GMM regression shows similarities in the estimated coefficients and sign to the result of the static cash model. Specifically, during the full sample period, we find that the coefficients of leverage and squared leverage are negative and positive, respectively, but insignificant. This result suggests that leverage and squared leverage do not play a significant role in determining SMEs' cash holdings. Furthermore, before the Korean financial crisis, the coefficient of leverage is negative and significant at the 10% level, whereas the squared leverage is positive and not significant. This result suggests that there is a weak leverage effect on cash holdings. However, after the Korean financial crisis, there appears to be a strong leverage effect, with substitution and precaution applied to cash holdings.The additional result reveals that the coefficient of the lagged cash is positive and significant at the 1% level, regardless of period. Moreover, the adjustment coefficient, λ is 0.44 (= 1 -0.56) for the full period, 0.21 (= 1 -0.79) before the Korean financial crisis and 0.59 (= 1 -0.41) after the Korean financial crisis. This evidence supports the view that SMEs adjust their cash holdings in an attempt to meet the target cash ratio. Interestingly, the data reveal that SMEs attempted to adjust their target cash holdings more quickly after the Korean financial crisis.
Control variables are explained in the following way. The effect of cash flows on cash holdings is positive but insignificant during the full period, negative but insignificant before the Korean financial crisis, and positive and significant after the Korean financial crisis. This result is consistent with the expectation that firms with higher cash flows will hold more cash because of their preference for internal rather than external financing (as seen in the "pecking order" view). The coefficient of bank debt is negative and significant at 10% for the full period but is positive and insignificant before the Korean financial crisis; contrariwise, it is negative and significant at the 5% level after the Korean financial crisis. This result demonstrates that, after the Korean financial crisis, listed Korean SMEs tended to be very closely tied to banks and used borrowing as a cash substitution. The result drawn from the dynamic cash model is similar to that of the static cash model. This finding is consistent with Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) .
Liquidity exerts a negative and insignificant effect before the Korean financial crisis but is positive and significant at the 1% level after the Korean financial crisis, suggesting that the higher liquidity, the larger the cash holdings. The positive coefficient means that firms can borrow more funds easily as they increase their liquidity. This result is in line with Williamson (1988) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992) . The GMM results of the relationship between growth opportunity (MBR) and cash holdings also show a negative relationship before the Korean financial crisis and a positive but insignificant relationship after the Korean financial crisis. These findings support the view that firms with greater growth opportunities are likely to have higher agency costs and are thus likely to resort to internal financing as soon as possible. One interesting result of the dynamic cash model stems from the size variable (Ln (Size)). That is, in contrast to the static cash model, the coefficient of size is positive and insignificant after the Korean financial crisis. This finding suggests that, while large firms hold lower levels of cash, there may be other factors affecting the way in which the size of a firm exerted influence on its financial policy concerning cash holding after the Korean financial crisis. This finding concerning the period after the Korean financial crisis is consistent with Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) .
It also appears that dividends are not significant determinants on cash holdings in the dynamic cash model for both sub-periods. Thus, SMEs do not appear to base their cash holding decisions on their dividend policy. Cash flow variability is negative and significant for the full sample period, but the coefficients of these variables are not significant at all (even the signs change) before and after the Korean financial crisis. It is clear that the external economic shock changed the SMEs' financial policy.
CONCLUSION
The following facts are clear. First, we find, unexpectedly, a negative but insignificant relationship between leverage and cash holding for the full sample period (from 1980 to 2008) . This means that leverage effect has a negative effect on cash holdings but does not play a key role in determining the cash holdings of listed SMEs. Interestingly, we find a significantly negative linear relationship between leverage and cash holdings before the Korean financial crisis, suggesting that cash holdings decreased as Korean SMEs increased their leverage during this period. This result implies that the substitution effect of cash is activated in the Korean SMEs' financial policy. However, we find the expected strong and significant quadratic relationship between leverage and cash holdings after the Korean financial crisis. This result implies that there are substitution and precautionary effects on cash holdings for Korean SMEs. Therefore, the economic shock stimulated Korean SMEs to accumulate cash holding from precautionary motives. This table reports panel GMM estimation result of dynamic cash holding model. GMM estimation uses as instrumental variables such as Net Cashi,t-2, Cash flowi,t-2, Leveragei,t-2, Leverage 2 i,t-2 , BankDi,t-2, Liquidityi,t-2, MBRi,t-2 , Ln(Size)i,t-2, CFVi,t-2, Owneri,t-2. ( ) is t-value with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and AR (1) and AR (2) tests are for residual series autocorrelation with normal N(0,1) under the null of instrument validity. Sargan test is the test of over-identifying restrictions, distributed as Chi-Square under the null of instrument variable validity. Notice: ***, **, and * denote significant 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. Furthermore, we make several findings by applying PAD to a consideration of market frictions, such as adjustment and transaction costs: we find results similar to those in the relationship between leverage and cash holdings. The result shows that the coefficients of leverage and squared leverage are negative and positive (respectively) but are insignificant for the full period. It also shows that the coefficient of leverage is negative and significant, although, squared leverage is not significant before the Korean financial crisis. However, we find a strong leverage effect with substitution and precautionary motives on cash holding after the Korean financial crisis. Furthermore, we also find that SMEs attempted to adjust their target cash holdings more quickly after the Korean financial crisis and that the adjustment coefficient after the Korean financial crisis period is nearer to 1 than it was at any time before the Korean financial crisis period.
We can draw some clear conclusions from our analysis of the relationship between cash holding and control variables.
First, firms with higher cash flows can be expected to hold more cash given their preference for internal over external financing. Secondly, after the Korean financial crisis, listed Korean SMEs were very closely tied to a bank and used the bank's borrowing capacity as a cash substitution because the coefficient of bank debt is negative and significant at the 5% level. Thirdly, firms with greater growth opportunities are likely to have higher agency costs and hence to resort to internal financing as soon as possible, because their liquidity is positive and significant at the 1% level. Fourthly, SMEs do not exert their dividend policies on their cash holding decisions, as the dividend does not determine the cash holdings in a dynamic cash model for either of the sub-periods.
Finally, we know that the cash flow variability and managerial ownership are negative and significant only during the full period. However, we can distinguish the dynamic cash model from the static model in the consideration of the relationship between cash holdings and size variable. The coefficient of size is positive and insignificant after the Korean financial crisis in contrast to that of the static cash model. This finding suggests that, while large firms hold lower levels of cash, other factors may affect the way in which the sizes of SME firms exert influence on the financial policies of their cash holding after a Korean financial crisis.
